3207. And she took a veil and covered herself. That this signifies appearances of truth is evident from the signification of the veil with which brides covered the face when they first saw the bridegroom, as being appearances of truth; for among the ancients brides represented the affections of truth, and bridegrooms the affections of good; or what is the same, brides represented the church, which was called a “bride” from the affection of truth; the affection of good which is from the Lord being the bridegroom, and hence all through the Word the Lord Himself is called the “bridegroom.” Brides veiled their faces on their first coming to the bridegroom, in order that they might represent appearances of truth. Appearances of truth are not truths in themselves, but they appear as truths; concerning which see below. The affection of truth cannot approach the affection of good except through appearances of truth; nor is it stripped of appearances until it is being conjoined; for then it becomes the truth of good, and becomes genuine insofar as the good is genuine.

[2] Good itself is holy, because it is the Divine proceeding from the Lord, and flows in by the higher way or gate in man; but insofar as its origin is concerned, truth is not holy; because it flows in by a lower way or gate, and at first is of the natural man; but when it is elevated thence toward the rational man it is by degrees purified; and at the first sight of the affection of good it is separated from memory-knowledges, and puts on appearances of truth, and thus comes near to good; an indication that such is its origin, and that it could not endure the first sight of Divine good until it has entered into the bridegroom’s chamber (that is, into the sanctuary of good), and the conjunction has been effected; for then truth no longer looks at good from appearances, or through appearances; but it is looked at from good apart from them.

[3] Be it known, however, that neither with man, nor indeed with an angel, are any truths ever pure, that is, devoid of appearances; for all both in general and in particular are appearances of truth; nevertheless they are accepted by the Lord as truths, provided good is in them. To the Lord alone belong pure truths, because Divine; for as the Lord is Good itself, so He is Truth itself. But see what has been said concerning truths and their appearances; namely, that the coverings and veils of the tent signified appearances of truth (n. 2576); that truths with man are appearances tainted with fallacies (n. 2053); that the rational things of man are appearances of truth (n. 2516); that truths are in appearances (n. 2196, 2203, 2209, 2242); that Divine good flows into appearances, even into fallacies (n. 2554); that appearances of truth are adapted by the Lord as if they were truths (n. 1832); that the Word is written according to appearances (n. 1838).

[4] But what appearances are may be clearly seen from those passages of the Word where it speaks according to appearances. There are however degrees of appearances of truth. Natural appearances of truth are mostly fallacies; but with those who are in good they are not to be called fallacies, but appearances, and even in some respects truths; for the good which is in them, and in which is the Divine, causes another essence to be in them. But rational appearances of truth are more and more interior; in them are the heavens, that is, the angels who are in the heavens (see n. 2576).

[5] In order that some idea may be formed of what appearances of truth are, let the following examples serve for illustration. I. Man believes that he is reformed and regenerated through the truth of faith; but this is an appearance; he is reformed and regenerated through the good of faith, that is, through charity toward the neighbor and love to the Lord. II. Man believes that truth enables us to perceive what good is, because it teaches; but this is an appearance; it is good that enables truth to perceive, for good is the soul or life of truth. III. Man believes that truth introduces to good when he lives according to the truth which he has learned; but it is good which flows into truth, and introduces it to itself. IV. It appears to man that truth perfects good, when yet good perfects truth. V. Goods of life appear to man to be the fruits of faith; but they are the fruits of charity. From these few examples it may in some measure be known what appearances of truth are. Such appearances are innumerable.

2209. And I am become old. That this signifies after it should no longer be of such a nature, namely, not Divine but human, and that this latter should be put off, is evident from the signification of “becoming old,” as being to put off the human (spoken of above, n. 2198, 2203). As regards the rational in general, when it thinks about Divine things, especially from its own truth, it cannot possibly believe that there are such things; both because it does not apprehend them, and because there adhere to it the appearances born from the fallacies of the senses by which and from which it thinks; as is evident from the examples adduced above (n. 2196); to which the following may be added for the sake of illustration.

[2] If the rational be consulted, can it believe that the Word has an internal sense, and this so remote from the literal sense as has been shown? And thus that the Word is that which conjoins heaven with earth, that is, the Lord’s kingdom in the heavens with the Lord’s kingdom on earth? Can the rational believe that souls after death speak with each other most distinctly, without the speech of words, and yet so fully as to express more in a minute than a man does by his speech in an hour? And that the angels do the same, but in a speech still more perfect, and one that is not perceivable by spirits? Also, that on coming into the other life all souls know how to speak in this way, although they receive no instruction in so speaking? Can the rational believe that in one affection of man, nay, in one sigh, there are such numberless things as can never be described, and yet are perceived by angels? And that every affection of man, nay, every idea of his thought, is an image of him, being such as to contain within it in a wonderful manner all the things of his life? Not to mention thousands upon thousands of such things.

[3] The rational, which is wise from sensuous things, and is imbued with their fallacies, when thinking of such things, does not believe that they can be so, because it is unable to form to itself any idea except from such things as it perceives by some sense either external or internal; and what then must be the case when it thinks about Divine celestial and spiritual things, which are still higher? For there must always be some appearances from sensuous things, upon which the thought must lean, and when these appearances are withdrawn, the idea perishes, as has also been evident to me from novitiate spirits, who take the greatest delight in the appearances which they have brought with them from the world, saying that if these should be taken away from them, they did not know whether they could think. Such is the rational as regarded in itself.