3525. And Jacob said to Rebekah his mother. That this signifies the Lord’s perception from Divine truth concerning natural truth, is evident from the signification of “saying,” in the historicals of the Word, as being to perceive (n. 3509); from the representation of Jacob, as being natural truth (n. 3305); and from the representation of Rebekah, as being the Divine truth of the Lord’s Divine rational (n. 3012, 3013, 3077). That perception from Divine truth concerning natural truth is signified, and not perception from natural truth concerning Divine truth, according to the appearance from the sense of the letter, is because all the observation the natural exercises is from the rational; here therefore, because predicated of the Lord, the signification is “from the Divine truth of the Divine rational.”

2619. As He had spoken. That this signifies as He had thought, is evident from the signification of “speaking,” as being to think (see n. 2271, 2287). The perception which is signified by “Jehovah said” was from the Divine celestial; but the thought which is signified by “Jehovah spoke” was from the Divine celestial through the Divine spiritual; and there is therefore an apparent repetition in the sense of the letter, namely, “as He said,” and “as He spake.” But what it is to perceive from the Divine celestial and to think from the Divine celestial through the Divine spiritual, does not fall into even the most enlightened apprehension by means of things that belong to the light of the world. This shows how infinite the rest of the Word may be. (That thought is from perception may be seen above, n. 1919, 2515.) With man the case is this: it is good from which he perceives, but it is truth by means of which he thinks. Good is of love and its affections, consequently from it is perception; but truth is of faith, consequently this is of thought. The former is signified in the historic parts of the Word by “saying,” but the latter by “speaking.” But when “saying” is found alone, it then sometimes signifies perceiving, and sometimes thinking; because “saying” involves both.