4096. And Rachel and Leah answered, and said unto him. That this signifies the reciprocity of the affections of truth, is evident from the signification of “answering” when assent is given, as being what is reciprocal (see n. 2919), and as being reception (n. 2941, 2957); and from the representation of Rachel, as being the affection of interior truth; and of Leah, as being the affection of external truth (see n. 3758, 3782, 3793, 3819). In the internal sense of what has gone before the subject treated of has been the good of the natural, which is signified by “Jacob,” when it was being separated from the mediate good, which is “Laban,” and how this good of the natural adjoined to itself the affections of truth, which are signified by “Rachel and Leah.” The subject now treated of is the reciprocal application to good of these affections of truth. This application is contained in the internal sense of the words which Rachel and Leah now say.

[2] But these things are of such a nature that they do not fall into any understanding except that which has been instructed, and which perceives delight in the memory-knowledge of such things, and which therefore has spiritual knowledges as its end. Others care nothing for such things, and cannot even apply their minds to them. For they who have worldly and earthly things as their end, cannot withdraw their senses from them; and even if they did so, they would perceive what is undelightful; in which case they would be departing and withdrawing from the things they have as their end, that is, which they love. Let anyone who is of such a nature put himself to the test, as to whether he desires to know how good adjoins itself to the affections of truth; and how the affections of truth apply themselves to good; and whether knowing this is irksome to him or not; and he will say that such things are of no benefit to him, and that he apprehends nothing about them.

[3] But if such things are told him as relate to his business in the world, even though they are of the most abstruse character, or if he be told the nature of another man’s affections, and how he may thereby join the man to himself by adapting himself both mentally and orally, this he not only apprehends, but also has a perception of the interior things connected with the matter. In like manner he who studies from affection to investigate the abstruse things of the sciences, loves to look and does look into things still more intricate. But when spiritual good and truth are in question, he feels the subject irksome and turns his back on it. These things have been said in order that the quality of the existing man of the church may be known.

[4] But how the case is with good when it adjoins truths to itself by affections, and with truths when they apply themselves to it, cannot so well appear when the idea or thought is directed to good and truth, but better when it is directed to the societies of spirits and angels through which these flow in; for as before said (n. 4067), man’s willing and thinking come from these societies, that is, flow in from them, and appear as if they were in him. To know how the case herein is from the societies of spirits and angels, is to know it from causes themselves; and to know it from the heaven of angels is to know it from the ends of these causes. There are also historical things which adjoin themselves, and illustrate these things, causing them to appear more plainly.

[5] The internal sense treats of the adjunction of good to truths, and of the application of these latter, in the natural; for as often before said Jacob is the good in the natural, and his women are the affections of truth. The good which is of love and charity flows in from the Lord, and does so through angels who are with man; but not into anything else in him than his knowledges. And as good is there fixed, the thought is kept in the truths of the knowledges; and from these many things are called up which are related and are in agreement; and this until the man thinks that it is so, and until he wills it from affection because it is so. When this is being done, good conjoins itself with truths, and the truths apply themselves in freedom; for all affection causes freedom (n. 2870, 2875, 3158, 4031).

[6] Even then, however, doubts and sometimes denials are excited by the spirits who have been joined to the man; but insofar as affection prevails, so far he is led to the affirmative, and he is then confirmed in truths by these very things. When good flows in in this manner, it is not perceived that it comes through angels, because it flows in so interiorly, and into the man’s obscurity which he has from worldly and corporeal things. Be it known however that good does not flow in from the angels, but through the angels from the Lord; and this all the angels confess, and therefore they never claim for themselves any good, and are even indignant when anyone attributes it to them. From all this then, as from causes themselves, it may be seen how the case is with the adjoining of good to truths, and with the application of these latter, which are the subjects here treated of in the internal sense.

3158. Tell me; and if not, tell me. That this signifies their free state of deliberation, is evident from the sense of the words. From all that precedes it is evident that the words which in the sense of the letter in this chapter treat of the betrothal and marriage of Rebekah with Isaac, in the internal sense treat of the initiation and conjunction of good and truth; for the initiation and conjunction of good and truth are spiritual betrothal and spiritual marriage. In each there is required a free state of deliberation. That this is necessary in betrothal and marriage, is well known; but that it is required in the initiation and conjunction of good and truth, is not so well known, because it is not apparent to the natural man, and because such initiation and conjunction are among the things that are accomplished without man’s reflecting upon them; nevertheless during every moment when man is being reformed and regenerated, it comes to pass that he is in a state of freedom when truth is being conjoined with good.

[2] Everyone may know, if he only considers, that nothing is ever man’s, as his, unless it is of his will; what is only of the understanding does not become man’s until it becomes of the will also; for what is of the will constitutes the being [esse] of a man’s life; but what is of the understanding constitutes the coming forth [existere] of his life thence derived. Consent from the understanding alone is not consent, but all consent is from the will; wherefore unless the truth of faith which is of the understanding is received by the good of love which is of the will, it is not at all truth which is acknowledged, and thus it is not faith. But in order that truth may be received by the good which is of the will, it is necessary that there be a free state. All that is of the will appears free; the very state of willing is liberty; for that which I will, that I choose, that I long for, because I love it and acknowledge it as good. All this shows that truth, which is of faith, never becomes man’s as his until it has been received by the will, that is, until it has been initiated and conjoined with the good there; and that this cannot be effected except in a free state.