405. XX. HUMAN PRUDENCE

Human prudence, called by others the providence of the rational mind, consists chiefly in so thinking out and ordinating the means to a good end, that the end may follow as though spontaneously in imitation of nature; that is, that the disposition and ordinating of the means may be as though natural, and may not seem to have proceeded from some previous intellect. This presupposes a cultivated and more perfect intellect, and also a mind which is concordant with such intellect. Nor does the end betray the intention. The greater the end, the better the prudence; for what is called prudence presupposes good; at least it presupposes that which is true or truly good in the intellect. If the prudence is to be supreme, it is requisite that the best end be had in view, to wit, the preservation of society, of the fatherland, of religion, of the glory of the Divine, and the like. When man proposes, God disposes, that is, Divine Providence concurs with human providence. In such case, the mind does not regard any end, not even the ultimate, save as an intermediate, unless in the ultimate is present that which is the first end. With the man who aims at this end and thus regards all other ends as intermediate, it is not requisite that his prudence be active of itself; it is rendered active by a superior love, and the means come forward as if of themselves.

123. VIII. THE PURE INTELLECT

(1) The pure intellect must first be treated of before treating of the mixed intellect, that is, of thought and our rational mind; for thought is mediate, as it were, between the pure intellect and the imagination, drawing its essence in a way from both; and to learn the nature of what is mediate or mixed, the prior and posterior things, that is to say, the extremes which enter in from both sides, must be investigated.