3539. And put them upon Jacob her younger son. That this signifies the affection of truth, or the life of good from truth, is evident from the representation of Rebekah, as being the Divine truth of the Divine rational; from the representation of Jacob, as being the Divine truth of the Divine natural; and from the signification of “putting upon,” as being here to communicate and to imbue, namely, the truths of good which are signified by the “garments of Esau” (n. 3537), thus the affection of truth of the natural, which is here the same as the life of good from truth. How these things are to be understood may be known from what was said above (n. 3518); but because they are such things as are at this day utterly unknown, it is permitted to unfold them somewhat further to the apprehension. In this chapter the Lord is treated of, and how He made His very natural Divine; and in the representative sense there is treated of the regeneration of man as to his natural (see n. 3490).

[2] The case herein with man is this: The end of regeneration is that man may be made new as to his internal man, thus as to his soul or spirit; but man cannot be made new or regenerated as to his internal man unless he is regenerated as to his external man also; for although after death man becomes a spirit, he nevertheless has with him in the other life the things which are of his external man, namely, natural affections, and also doctrinal things, and even memory-knowledges; in a word, all things of the exterior or natural memory (see n. 2475-2483); for these are the planes in which his interiors are terminated; and therefore according to the disposition that has been made of these things is the character of interior things when they flow into them, because they are modified in them. This shows that man must be regenerated or made new not only as to his internal or rational man, but also as to his external or natural man; and unless this were the case there would not be any correspondence. (That there is a correspondence between the internal man and its spiritual things, and the external man and its natural things, may be seen above, n. 2971, 2987, 2989-2990, 3002, 3493)

[3] The state of the regeneration of man is described in a representative sense in this chapter by “Esau” and “Jacob;” here, the quality of man’s first state while he is being regenerated, or before he has been regenerated; for this state is entirely inverted in respect to that in which man is when he has been regenerated. For in the former state, during regeneration, or before he has been regenerated, intellectual things which are of truth apparently act the first part; but when he has been regenerated, the things of the will, which are of good, act the first part. That intellectual things which are of truth apparently act the first part in the first state, was represented by Jacob, in that he claimed the birthright of Esau for himself (see n. 3325, 3336); and also in that he claimed the blessing, which is here treated of; and that the state has been completely inverted, is represented by Jacob’s feigning to be Esau, in clothing himself with the garments of Esau and the skins of the kids of the she-goats; for in this state rational truth not yet thus conjoined with rational good, or what is the same, the understanding not thus conjoined with the will, in this manner inflows and acts into the natural, and disposes inversely the things which are there.

[4] This can also be seen from much experience, especially from the fact that a man is able to observe in the understanding, and thereby his natural can know, many things which are good and true, and yet the will cannot as yet act in accordance with them; as for instance that love and charity are the essential in man: this the intellectual faculty of man can see and confirm, but until he has been regenerated the will faculty cannot acknowledge it: there are even those who are in no love to the Lord whatever, and in no charity toward the neighbor, who well apprehend this. In like manner that love is the very life of man, and that such as the love is, such is the life; and likewise that everything delightful and everything pleasant is from love, consequently all joy and all happiness; and therefore also such as the love is, such is the joy and such the happiness. A man is also able to apprehend in his understanding, even should his will dissent or go contrary thereto, that the happiest life is from love to the Lord and from charity toward the neighbor, because the very Divine flows into it; and on the other hand that the most miserable life is from the love of self and the love of the world, because hell flows into it; and from this it may be perceptible to the understanding, yet not to the will, that love to the Lord is the life of heaven, and that mutual love is the soul from this life; and therefore insofar as a man does not think from the life of his will, nor reflect upon his life derived therefrom, so far he perceives this in his understanding; but insofar as he thinks from the life of his will, so far he does not perceive, nay denies it.

[5] Also to the understanding it may clearly appear that it is into the humiliation with a man that the Divine can inflow; for the reason that in this state the loves of self and of the world, and consequently the infernal things which oppose, are removed; but yet so long as the will is not new and the understanding has not been united to it, the man cannot be in humiliation of heart; nay, insofar as the man is in a life of evil, that is, insofar as his will is toward evil, so far this state is not possible; and what is more, so far the matter is obscure to him, and so far he even denies it. Hence also a man can perceive in his understanding that the humiliation of man is not for the sake of the Lord’s love of glory, but for the sake of His Divine love, and in order that He can thereby inflow with good and truth and make the man blessed and happy; nevertheless so far as the will is consulted, so far this is obscured. The same is true in very many other cases.

[6] This faculty of man of being able to understand what is good and true although he does not will it, has been given to man in order that he may have the capacity of being reformed and regenerated; on which account this faculty exists with the evil as well as with the good; nay, with the evil it is sometimes more acute, but with this difference, that with the evil there is no affection of truth for the sake of life, that is, for the sake of the good of life from truth, and therefore they cannot be reformed; but with the good there is the affection of truth for the sake of life, that is, for the sake of the good of life, and therefore they can be reformed. But the first state of the reformation of these is that the truth of doctrine appears to them to be in the first place, and the good of life in the second, because they do what is good from truth; and their second state is that the good of life is in the first place, and the truth of doctrine in the second, for then they do what is good from good, that is, from the will of good; and when this is the case, because the will has been conjoined with the understanding as in a marriage, the man has been regenerated. In the internal sense these two states are treated of in the things said concerning Esau and Jacob.

3539. ‘Et induit Jacobum filium suum minorem’: quod significet affectionem veri seu vitam boni ex vero, constat ex repraesentatione ‘Rebeccae’ quod sit Divinum Verum Divini Rationalis; ex repraesentatione ‘Jacobi’ quod sit Divinum Verum Divini Naturalis; et ex significatione ‘induere’ quod hic sit communicare, ac imbuere, nempe vera boni, quae per ‘vestes Esavi’ n. 3537 significantur, ita affectionem veri naturalis, quae hic idem est cum vita boni ex vero. Quomodo haec intelligenda sunt, ¹ sciri potest ab illas quae supra n. 3518 dicta sunt; sed quia talia sunt quae hodie ignotissima, licet ² eadem adhuc ad captum aliquatenus explicare: agitur in hoc capite ³ de Domino, quomodo Ipse Naturale Suum Divinum fecit; et in sensu repraesentativo de regeneratione hominis quoad ejus naturale, videatur n. 3490.

[2] Cum homine ita se habet: regeneratio pro fine habet ut homo novus fiat quoad internum suum hominem, ita quoad animam seu spiritum; sed non novus fieri seu regenerari potest homo quoad illum nisi quoque quoad externum; nam tametsi homo post mortem fit spiritus, usque secum habet in altera vita illa quae sunt externi hominis, nempe affectiones naturales, et quoque doctrinalia, etiam scientifica, verbo omnia quae sunt memoriae exterioris seu naturalis, videatur n. 2475-2483; haec enim sunt plana in quibus terminantur interiora ejus; qualiter itaque illa disposita sunt, taliter interiora cum influunt, fiunt, nam inibi modificantur; exinde patet quod homo non modo regenerandus sit, seu novus fieri debeat quoad internum hominem seu rationalem, sed etiam quoad externum seu naturalem; et nisi hoc, nec foret aliqua correspondentia; quod correspondentia sit inter ⁴ internum hominem et hujus spiritualia, ac externum et hujus naturalia, videatur n. ⁵ 2987, 2989-2991, 3002, 3493:

[3] status regenerationis hominis, in sensu repraesentativo in hoc capite, per Esavum et Jacobum describitur; et hic primus ejus qualis est, nempe cum homo regeneratur seu antequam regeneratus est; est enim status plane inversus respective ad illum statum in quo est homo cum ⁶ regeneratus est; in illo enim statu, nempe cum homo regeneratur seu antequam regeneratus est, tunc intellectualia quae sunt veri, apparenter primas agunt; at cum regeneratus est, tunc voluntaria quae sunt boni; quod intellectualia quae sunt veri, apparenter primas agant in primo statu, repraesentatum est per Jacobum quod primogenituram Esavi sibi vindicaverit, videatur n. 3325, 3336; tum quod benedictionem ⁷ , de qua hic agitur; et quod status plane inversus sit, repraesentatur per quod Jacobus mentitus Esavum, quod nempe vestibus Esavi indutus, et quod pellibus haedorum caprarum; in hoc enim statu, rationale verum, nondum ita conjunctum rationali bono, seu quod idem, intellectus non ita conjunctus cum voluntate, sic influit et agit in naturale, ac ea quae ibi ⁸ , sic inverse disponit:

[4] hoc quoque constare potest a pluri experientia, ⁹ imprimis ex illa quod homo ¹⁰ intellectu possit appercipere et naturale inde scire plura quae bona et vera sunt, sed usque voluntas adhuc non possit secundum illa facere; ut pro exemplo: quod amor et charitas sit essentiale apud hominem, hoc potest intellectualis facultas hominis videre et confirmare, sed antequam regeneratus est homo, ¹¹ voluntaria non potest agnoscere; sunt quoque ¹² in prorsus nullo amore in Dominum et in nulla charitate erga proximum, qui hoc bene capiunt: pariter quod amor sit ipsa vita hominis, et quod talis vita, qualis amor: ut et quod omne jucundum et omne amoenum sit ex amore, proinde omne gaudium et omnis felicitas; et quoque inde, qualis amor, tale gaudium et talis felicitas; etiam id potest homo ex intellectu capere, tametsi voluntas dissentit aut etiam in contrarium it, quod felicissima vita sit ex amore in Dominum et ex amore erga proximum, quia Ipsum Divinum influit in illam; et vicissim quod infelicissima vita sit ex amore sui et amore mundi, quia infernum influit in illam:

[5] inde etiam coram intellectu perceptibile potest esse, non autem coram voluntate, quod amor in Dominum sit vita caeli, et quod amor mutuus sit anima ex illa vita; quapropter quantum homo non ex voluntatis suae vita cogitat, nec super vitam inde suam reflectit, tantum id intellectu percipit, sed quantum ex vita voluntatis suae, tantum non percipit, immo negat. Etiam coram intellectu clare potest apparere quod humiliatio sit in quam apud hominem influere possit Divinum, ex causa quia in eo statu removentur amores sui et mundi, proinde infernalia quae obstant; sed usque, quamdiu voluntas non nova est, et ¹³ huic unitus intellectus, homo in humiliatione cordis non potest esse; immo quantum homo in vita mali est, hoc est, quantum ejus voluntas est ad malum, tantum hoc non potest; etiam tantum ei hoc obscurum est, et quoque tantum illud negat: inde etiam homo intellectu percipere potest quod humiliatio hominis non sit propter amorem gloriae in Domino, sed propter amorem Divinum, quod Dominus ita cum bono et vero influere possit, et hominem beatum et felicem facere; at quantum voluntas consulitur, tantum hoc obscuratur; similiter se habet in perpluribus aliis.

[6] Haec facultas, nempe quod intelligere possit quid bonum et verum tametsi non vult illud, data est homini ut possit reformari et regenerari; eapropter illa facilitas est tam penes malos quam apud bonos, immo penes malos quandoque acutior; sed cum hac differentia, quod penes malos non sit aliqua affectio veri propter vitam, hoc est, propter bonum vitae ex vero, quapropter nec possunt reformari; at apud bonos est affectio veri propter vitam, hoc est, propter bonum vitae ¹⁴ , et propterea hi possunt reformari: sed status primus reformationis horum est quod verum doctrinae appareat illis primo loco esse et bonum vitae secundo, nam ex vero agunt bonum; at secundus status eorum est quod bonum vitae sit primo loco et verum doctrinae secundo, nam ex bono agunt bonum, hoc est, ex voluntate boni; et cum hoc fit, tunc quia voluntas est conjuncta intellectui, sicut conjugio, homo regeneratus est. De binis his statibus, in illis quae de Esavo et Jacobo in sensu interno agitur.

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