3582. Be thou a master to thy brethren. That this signifies the dominion at first appearing to be of that of the affection of natural truth over the affections of natural good, is evident from the signification of being “a master,” as being dominion and from the signification of “brethren,” as being the affections of good, here, of natural good (n. 367, 2360, 3303). (Concerning the apparent dominion at first of truth over good, see n. 3324-3325, 3330, 3332, 3336, 3470, 3539, 3548, 3556, 3563, 3570)

3563. And said, The voice is Jacob’s voice, but the hands are the hands of Esau. That this signifies that in this case the intellectual part is of truth which is within, but that the will part is of good which is without, thus that they are of inverted order, is evident from the predication of “voice” as being of truth, and from the predication of “hand” as being of good (that “voice” is predicated of truth is evident from what was adduced in Part First,n. 219-220); and from its being said, “the voice is Jacob’s voice,” by whom is represented natural truth, as has been repeatedly shown above. And the reason why “hand” is predicated of good is that by “hand” is signified power and faculty (n. 878, 3541), which is derived from no other source than good, all the power and faculty of truth being therefrom, although it appears to be from truth; the same is evident also from its being said, “the hands are the hands of Esau,” by whom good is represented, as also has been shown above. That these things are of inverted order is evident from the fact that it is according to order for good which is of the will to be within, and for truth which is of the understanding to be without. However, as before said, these things are such that they cannot be so well set forth to the apprehension, because few are in any knowledge concerning such things; for even if they should be most clearly set forth, yet when knowledge is wanting they are not apprehended and yet it is necessary to state how the case is, because this is the subject here treated of.

[2] The good of the natural comes forth from no other source in man than interior good, that is, from the good of the rational; that the natural has good from no other source is evident; but the influx causes the good in the natural to be such as the natural is; and as this is the only source of the good of the natural, the truth of the natural is from the same source; for where good is, there is truth, both being necessary in order that there may be anything; but the influx causes the truth therein to be such as is that into which it flows. The influx takes place in this way: The good of the rational flows into the natural in two ways; through the shortest way, into the good itself of the natural, thus immediately; and through the good of the natural into the truth there; this good and this truth are what is represented by Esau and his hunting. The good of the rational also flows into the natural by a way less short, namely, through the truth of the rational, and by this influx forms something like good, but it is truth.

[3] It is according to order that the good of the rational should inflow into the good of the natural and at the same time into its truth, immediately; and also through the truth, of the rational into the good of the natural, thus mediately; and in like manner into the truth of the natural both immediately and mediately; and when this is the case, then the influx is according to order. Such influx exists with those who have been regenerated; but as before said there is another influx before they have been regenerated, namely, that the good of the rational does not flow immediately into the good of the natural, but mediately through the truth of the rational, and thus presents something like good in the natural, but which is not genuine good, and consequently not genuine truth; yet it is such that inmostly it really has good from the influx through the truth of the rational; but no further. Therefore also good comes forth there under another form, namely, outwardly like the good which is represented by Esau, but inwardly like the truth which is represented by Jacob; and as this is not according to order, it is said to be of inverted order; but yet in respect to the fact that man can be regenerated in no other way, it is according to order.

[4] I am aware that these things, even though clearly stated, and consequently possible of clear perception on the part of those who are in the knowledge of such things, are yet obscure to those who do not know what influx is; and still more so to those who do not know that the rational is distinct from the natural; and still more so to those who have not any distinct idea about good and truth. But what the quality of natural good is, and of natural truth, in the state previous to regeneration, can appear solely from the affections at that time. When man is affected with truth, not for the sake of ends of life, but for the sake of other ends, such as that he may become learned, and this from a certain affection of emulation, or from a certain affection of childish envy, and also from a certain affection of glory; then are the good of the natural and the truth of the natural in such an order as is here represented by Jacob, consequently relatively to each other they are in inverted order; that is, the will part which is of good is without, and the intellectual part which is of truth is within.

[5] But in the state after regeneration it is otherwise; for then man is not only affected with truth for the sake of ends of life, but still more is he affected with the good itself of life; and the former affections, namely those of emulation, of childish envy, and of glory, separate themselves, and this until it appears as if they were dissipated; for then the good which is of the will is within, and the truth which is of the understanding is without; yet still in such a manner that truth acts as a one with good, because from good. This order is genuine; and the former order tends to the forming of this order, inasmuch as the will part, which is then without, admits many things that are serviceable to regeneration, and is like a sponge that absorbs both clear and muddy waters; thus also it admits things that would otherwise be rejected, which yet serve as means, and also for forming ideas about goods and truths, and for other uses.