487. 7. Adulteries committed by such people are mild. This follows from the observations made above in no. 486, without need of further demonstration. For people know that the character of every deed, in general the character of every event, depends on the circumstances, and that these mitigate or aggravate it.

Adulteries of this degree are mild, however, the first time they are committed. And they also remain mild to the extent in the subsequent course of his or her life the adulterer or adulteress refrains from them for the reason that they are evils against God, or are evils against the neighbor, or because they are evils contrary to the good of civil society, and in consequence of one or the other of these, because they are evils contrary to reason. But on the other hand, adulteries of this degree are also reckoned among the more grave ones if they do not refrain from them for one of the aforementioned reasons. Thus the case is in accordance with the Divine law, in Ezekiel 18:21-22,24, ¹ and elsewhere.

Still, such adulteries cannot by man be excused or condemned or attributed and judged as mild or grave on these grounds, because they are not visible to his sight; indeed, neither are they within the scope of his judgment. What we mean, therefore, is that they are so reckoned and imputed after death.

脚注:

486. 6. Adulteries of the first degree are adulteries of ignorance, which are committed by people who are not yet able to or cannot consult the intellect and so prevent them. All evils, including therefore adulteries, are, viewed in themselves, products of the inward and outward self. The inward self intends them and the outward self commits them. Consequently, whatever the character of the inward self is in the deeds which it commits through the agency of the outward self, such is the character of the deeds regarded in themselves. Nevertheless, because the inward self and its intention are not visible to men, everyone has to be judged publicly on the basis of his actions and words in accordance with the enacted law and its strictures. The inner sense of the law ought to be regarded by the judge as well.

But to illustrate by examples: Suppose, for instance, that adultery is committed by an adolescent boy who does not yet know that adultery is a greater evil than fornication. Suppose that it is committed by a person of extreme simplicity. Suppose that it is committed by someone who as a result of illness has lost his power of judgment; or by someone who experiences periods of delirium, as happens with some, and who is then in the same state as people actually deranged. Or again, suppose that it is committed in a state of raving drunkenness; and so on. It is evident that the inward self or mind is then not present in the outward one, scarcely differently from the way it is not in an irrational person.

The adulteries of such people are attributed to them by a rational person in accordance with the circumstances. Yet the same person, sitting as judge, still convicts and punishes the doer in accordance with the law; while after death their adulteries are imputed to them in accordance with the presence, character and capability of understanding present in their will.