4757. 'And they drew Joseph out and caused him to come up out of the pit' means the help provided by these so that [Divine Truth] is no longer among falsities. This is clear from the meaning of 'drawing out and causing to come up' as delivering and therefore as providing help, dealt with below, and from the meaning of 'the pit' as falsities, dealt with in 4728, and so as its being no longer among falsities. The reason 'drawing out and causing to come up' here means providing help is that truth is what brings help to good. For truth has power attributed to it because good exercises its power by means of truth, 3091, 3563. Furthermore truth is the means by which falsity is recognized, and so by which help is provided so that it is no longer among falsities. This is the reason why it was the Midianites who drew Joseph out and caused him to come up out of the pit, but why it was the Ishmaelites who bought him.

4345. 'And he put the servant-girls and their sons first, and Leah and her sons further back, and Rachel and Joseph even further back' means an ordering beginning with quite general things in which all else is included. This becomes clear from what has been stated directly above about the meaning of 'the servant-girls, Leah, Rachel, and their sons' to the effect that 'the servant-girls' means the affections for knowledge and for cognitions, 'Leah' the affection for exterior truth, and 'Rachel' the affection for interior truth. The affections for knowledge and for cognitions are the most external ones since knowledge and cognitions are the foundations out of which truths arise and on which they are based. The affection for external truth follows them and is more interior, while the affection for interior truth is more interior still. The more external they are the more general they are too, and the more internal they are the less general they are and in relation to the general are called particular and specific.

[2] With regard to general truths, they are called general because they are made up of the particular truths and so include the particular ones within them. General truths without particular ones are not general truths, but are called such from the particular. They are like a general whole and its parts. No general whole can be called a whole if there are no parts, for the parts make up the whole. Indeed nothing exists in the nature of things which does not first exist from and then continue to exist from things other than itself. That which exists and continues to exist from things other than itself is called general, and the things which compose it and keep it in existence are called particular. Being composed of internal things, external ones in relation to internal are therefore general. The same applies to the human being and his mental faculties: the more external these are the more general they are since they are composed of things that are more interior, while these in turn are composed of those that are inmost.

[3] In relation to the rest of the human being the actual body and the things belonging to the body, as its external senses and its actions are called, are most general. The natural mind and the things belonging to the natural mind are less general because they are more internal, and in relation to the body and bodily things are called particulars. The rational mind however and the things belonging to the rational mind are more internal still, and are - in relation to the body, the natural mind and the things belonging to these - called specifics. These differences are clearly observable by a person when he casts aside his body and becomes a spirit, for then he is able to observe clearly that the things of the body had been nothing more than the most general forms taken by the things of his spirit, and that bodily things received their existence and were kept in existence by those of his spirit. Thus he sees that the things of his spirit in relation to those of his body were particulars. And when the same spirit becomes an angel, that is, when he is raised up into heaven, he is able to observe that the same things which previously he has seen and experienced in an obscure light he now sees and experiences in their particular form and in bright light. For he now observes countless details which previously he had seen and experienced as a single entity.

[4] The same is also evident from what is the case while that person is living in the world. The things which he sees and experiences in early childhood are most general, whereas those which he sees and experiences in later childhood and youth are the particular aspects of those general ones; and those that he sees and experiences in adult years are the specific details of those particular aspects. For as a person advances in years he introduces the particular ideas into general ones acquired in early childhood, and after that specific notions into the particular ideas; for he advances gradually towards more interior things, filling what is the general with the particular, and the particular with the specific. From this one may now see the implications of an ordering beginning with general things in which all else is included, which is the meaning of 'he put the servant-girls and their sons first, Leah and her sons further back, and Rachel and Joseph even further back'.

[5] A similar situation exists when a person is being regenerated, or what amounts to the same, when in him truths are being joined to good; and this situation is the subject here. During that time general affections together with their truths, meant here by 'the servant-girls and their sons', are the first to be introduced into good; after that the less general are introduced, that is, those which in relation to the general are particular, meant here by 'Leah and her sons'; and finally the less general still, that is, those which in relation to the same are specific, meant here by 'Rachel and Joseph'. For when being regenerated a person passes so to speak through comparable phases of life - he experiences early childhood first; after that later childhood and youth; and finally adult years.